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I. INTRODUCTION 
We cannot completely overcome the difficulties caused by the sepa-
ration of ownership and control. In The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner Means focused our attention on 
what was then a relatively new phenomenon: widely dispersed public 
shareholding.1 They marveled at how, for the first time in the history of 
the American economy, the owners of assets had so little to do with the 
management of those assets, and managers had so much power over so 
much wealth that did not belong to them.2 Berle and Means described 
what we now call the Berle−Means corporation, the publicly traded cor-
poration with widely dispersed share ownership. The agency costs occa-
sioned by the combined power of managers and indifference of share-
holders have preoccupied legislators, judges, investors, and scholars. 
Still, we have no answer. 
We do not know how to make the agency costs of a publicly held 
firm as low as the agency costs of a privately held firm. We cannot make 
the managers of those significant assets faithful trustees, nor do we care 
to.3 Public share ownership has a different character than other types of 
business, or asset, ownership.4 
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 1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 3–4 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932). 
 2. Id. at 18 (“Within [the corporate system] there exists a centripetal attraction which draws 
wealth together into aggregations of constantly increasing size, at the same time throwing control 
into the hands of fewer and fewer men.”). 
 3. Unlike trustees, corporate officers and directors are not bound by a duty of obedience, nor 
are they held to a “prudent man” standard. Ellen Taylor, New and Unjustified Restrictions on Dela-
ware Directors’ Authority, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 837, 877 (1996). Rather, their management decisions 
are given significant deference under the business judgment rule, and corporate officers and directors 
are neither expected, nor required, to conservatively follow the instructions of equity holders. See 
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Those studying the various governance forms used by businesses in 
our economy have concluded that the corporation is the form devoted to 
managing the agency costs resulting from public shareholding.5 Tools 
like the independent board of directors, mandatory fiduciary duties owed 
by those directors, and capital lock-in define the corporate form, and are 
supposed to be designed for managing the agency costs of the public 
firm.6 These governance mechanisms have, at times, spectacularly failed 
to discipline corporate managers to operate public businesses in a manner 
consistent with the best interests of rationally apathetic, widely dispersed 
shareholders.7 The trouble may stem from reserving a role in corporate 
governance for these indifferent shareholders whom the law regards as 
owners but who do not meaningfully fulfill that role. 
Uncorporations⎯unincorporated firms such as partnerships, limited 
partnerships, and now limited liability companies⎯are the preferred 
business forms for small businesses and entrepreneurs, for those who 
really want to be business owners.8 Because there are fewer owners and 
the owners tend to be more sophisticated, owners of uncorporations can 
more closely monitor management. They can require distributions from 
the firm in a way public shareholders cannot, and they can specify exit 
rights at the firm’s inception.9 Uncorporate managers are often also own-
ers of the firm, so their interests can be more closely tied to the firm’s 
success so they may accept downside risk.10  
Uncorporations often play an important role in the life of a public 
corporation. For example, during times of financial distress, an invest-
ment firm organized as an uncorporation might take the public firm pri-
vate and reorganize it. Or the investment firm might realize gains by 
buying debt that it can convert to equity shares, which are later offered to 
                                                                                                             
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1735, 1747 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment] (“[T]he business judg-
ment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in [Delaware General Corporation 
Law] § 141(a), that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its 
board of directors . . . . The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free 
exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors.”); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
 4. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 5. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 193 (2010). 
 6. See id. at 67–72. 
 7. Id. at 195. 
 8. Id. at 1. Ribstein coined the term “uncorporation” to describe these business forms as alter-
natives to the corporation. Id. 
 9. Id. at 5. Exit rights are the rights equity holders have to receive a payment for their interest 
and leave the firm. See id. at 151. 
 10. Id. at 208. 
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the public in a bankruptcy reorganization.11 Uncorporations influence 
public firms when agency costs are relatively low, when widely dis-
persed shareholders have lost interest, and when they can capture most, if 
not all, of the gains of correcting management mistakes and turning the 
firm around.12 Uncorporations also hold portfolios of public companies 
as investments and sometimes take an active role in influencing the man-
agement of those firms.13 
In this Article, I argue that by encouraging and enhancing the inter-
action between corporations and uncorporations, rather than making 
them more alike, we can realize the best outcomes for investors. If corpo-
rations and uncorporations are pushed to adapt the best parts of the oth-
er’s governance structure, they may begin to share the same problems. 
Instead of sharing governance forms, it makes more sense to allow the 
forms to interact, using uncorporate governance to more effectively per-
form the shareholder role in corporate governance. Then, we broaden 
access to investment in uncorporations so that it is easier for all kinds of 
investors to diversify across business forms—to invest, in different ways, 
both in closely held uncorporations and publicly held corporations. This 
would involve tweaking access to different investment vehicles rather 
than tweaking the law of firm governance itself. 
Part II of this Article evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of 
the governance form of the public corporation. The Berle−Means corpo-
ration offers access to significant capital and ways to diversify away 
firm-specific risk, but it places rationally apathetic, widely dispersed 
“owners” in a position of control, despite their inability to monitor man-
agement or reduce agency costs. Part III explores the advantages and 
disadvantages of investment in private uncorporations. While private 
uncorporations have lower agency costs than Berle−Means corporations, 
there are some disadvantages to investors in owning closely held 
uncorporations, such as an inability to fully diversify away risk. Part IV 
suggests that the answer to the governance problems confronting both 
governance forms is to change the ways we think about investment, ra-
ther than tinkering with governance mechanisms. If we open public in-
vestment to allow investors to choose a number of different vehicles, 
investors may choose to take a more active role in governance when they 
want to realize certain gains and may be more able to accept a role that 
looks less like “ownership” when they want to remain more passive. 
True interaction between private uncorporations and public corporations 
                                                 
 11. Id. at 222–23; JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, 
PROMISES BROKEN 241–42 (2008). 
 12. RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, at 225. 
 13. Id. at 225–26. 
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and shared investors may allow us to lower the agency costs of each type 
of investment and may allow the different business forms to operate bet-
ter by operating together. 
II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE 
BERLE−MEANS CORPORATION 
Different business forms contemplate different ways to organize the 
management of the assets comprising a business.14 While the many forms 
of business association share similarities, each has defining characteris-
tics that set it apart from the others and allow it to accommodate different 
ownership structures and priorities. Of the many kinds of business asso-
ciations, the corporate form is the one designed to manage the agency 
costs of public firms with widely dispersed, inattentive shareholder own-
ers.15 
The bulk of the agency costs associated with the public firm are 
caused by the fact that the “owners” of the firm,16 or the owners of the 
residual claim, are rationally apathetic: they would much rather exit an 
underperforming firm than take action to improve or discipline its man-
agement.17 When shareholders do not take care to monitor management, 
they must rely on other mechanisms to constrain agency costs. Those 
mechanisms are found to some extent, though not exclusively, in the 
governance structure of the corporate form. The market has devised new 
governance tools over time, showing that there is some flexibility in the 
corporate form and that its mandatory structures may be among its weak-
est features. 
This Part discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the corpo-
rate form, as well as market-based mechanisms that have arisen to fill in 
governance gaps. 
                                                 
 14. Id. at 26–27. 
 15. Though large groups of shareholders are represented by institutional investors who make 
investment and corporate governance decisions on behalf of individual shareholders (the “benefi-
cial” owners of the stock), the dominance of institutional shareholder investing does not materially 
change the widely dispersed nature of public shareholding. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in 
Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 664–65 n.161 (2006). 
 16. For scholarship explaining why we should be wary of viewing shareholders as absolute 
owners of the firm, see for example, William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder 
Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002); Fisch, supra note 15, at 649, 657–59; David Millon, Redefining 
Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 230–33 (1991); and Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Ar-
guments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002). 
 17. Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder 
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 462 (1991). 
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A. The Corporate Form 
The board of directors, mandatory fiduciary duties, and capital 
lock-in are the defining features of the corporate form. These features set 
the corporate form apart from its uncorporate cousins. Shareholders are 
considered the “owners” of the corporation and are supposed to be repre-
sented by a board of directors that is responsible for monitoring senior 
officers who run the day-to-day business of the firm.18 Corporate direc-
tors owe a mandatory fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation.19 
Shareholders, even the rationally apathetic shareholders of the Berle-
Means corporation, are expected to enforce those fiduciary duties on the 
corporation’s behalf. 
Corporations are not expected to regularly distribute profits to 
shareholders. Rather, partially because of double corporate taxation, 
shareholders would prefer that assets stay in the corporation and be used 
to enhance the firm’s business.20 Capital lock-in allows corporate man-
agers to pursue long-term projects with a greater degree of confidence in 
the amount of capital available; it also gives them power and discretion 
over significantly more assets.21 
While the corporate form dominates the market of public firms, 
many of its hallmarks are marginalized in practice. Publicly traded cor-
porations must have a majority of outside directors on their boards, 
meaning a majority of a firm’s board members cannot have other signifi-
cant financial ties to the firm.22 These “outside directors lack time, in-
formation, and inclination to participate effectively in management.”23 
The pathologies of the board of directors are well-known and well-
documented.24 For now, it is enough to say that the board has not proven 
                                                 
 18. Brian M. McCall, The Corporation as Imperfect Society, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 509, 515–16 
(2011). 
 19. 1 JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN & R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.16 (2012); see also Anadarko Petrol. Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 
545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988) (“It is a basic principle of Delaware General Corporation Law that 
directors are subject to the fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and disinterestedness. Specifical-
ly, directors cannot stand on both sides of the transaction nor derive any personal benefit through 
self-dealing.”). 
 20. The alternative is flow-through taxation when equity holders are taxed individually for the 
company’s gains. Corporate shareholders prefer to leave corporate gains in the firm so that they do 
not have to pay tax on the firm’s income. Margaret Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law 
Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 433 (2003). 
 21. Id. at 439–40. 
 22. Tamar Frankel, Corporate Boards of Directors: Advisors or Supervisors?, 77 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 501, 506–07 (2008). 
 23. RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, at 201 (citing MILES MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 
(1971)). 
 24. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 
145–76 (2010) (highlighting the disadvantages of outside board members); Ronald J. Gilson & 
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to be an effective monitoring or management device as currently consti-
tuted. As legislative reforms push to make the board increasingly inde-
pendent, the role of the board in corporate management has become in-
creasingly marginalized, as the officers the directors are supposed to 
monitor dominate corporate decision-making. 
Shareholders’ ability to discipline directors is extremely limited and 
ineffective. The fiduciary duty of loyalty is narrow and rarely breached.25 
Most shareholder litigation attempts to enforce the duty of care. But the 
duty of care has completely atrophied in the shadows of the business 
judgment rule and Delaware legislation that allows corporations to opt 
out of liability for its breach.26 Fiduciary duties are more about setting 
norms than about imposing serious liability against faithless or careless 
directors.27 The relative weakness of the legal enforcement of corporate 
fiduciary duties diminishes their force as norms. Norms are flexible and 
change over time; they are not capable of definitive enforcement.28 
Norms are hardly “mandatory” governors of behavior. 
Shareholder voting is also of limited utility because rationally apa-
thetic shareholders do not pay enough attention to exercise their fran-
chise knowledgably or meaningfully. For the most part, they defer to 
                                                                                                             
Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 
STAN. L. REV 863, 872 (1991) (explaining why board members lack the incentives to monitor man-
agement carefully and why they are more loyal to managers than they are to shareholders); Donald 
C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Conse-
quences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 816–17 (2001) (explaining ways in 
which independent boards fall short of their intended monitoring and management purposes). See 
generally MACE, supra note 23; Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 
(1997). 
 25. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV., 247, 298–99 (1999). Despite sounding broad, the duty of loyalty has been interpreted by 
courts rather narrowly. Id. at 298. 
 26. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2011); Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of 
Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 465 (2009) (“In the aftermath of the Smith v. 
Van Gorkom decision, a controversial duty of care case, the Delaware legislature enacted section 
102(b)(7) as a means of limiting the liability risk faced by boards of directors. This statute provided 
for the potential exculpation of directors from monetary liability based on violations of their duty of 
care.”); see also Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of 
Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1776 (2007) (“‘[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of the 
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information 
and reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to 
liability.’” (quoting In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996))). 
 27. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the 
Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1662–63 (2001); see also Kelli A. Alces, 
Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 243 (2009). 
 28. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 27, at 1644–45 (describing the evolutionary nature of 
norm development). 
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management, especially in director elections.29 Institutional shareholders, 
who represent large numbers of individual shareholders in investing and 
monitoring, delegate responsibility for deciding how to exercise the 
shareholder franchise to proxy advisors.30 Unsurprisingly, attempts to 
empower a widely dispersed group of rationally apathetic owners fall 
flat, and these owners’ elected part-time “representatives” can be easily 
marginalized. 
The defining features of the corporate form are not supposed to be 
flexible at all; they are supposed to be mandatory.31 While the features 
are honored in form, they are cast aside as mere formalities in practice. 
The fact that corporate governance on the ground has been able to grow 
around the obstacles of the mandatory requirements of the corporate 
form shows that corporate actors are able to organize a governance re-
gime that pays lip service to the requirements of the corporate form while 
escaping its intended strictures. In practice, the statutory corporate form 
has adapted to public investment. The shareholder role has been margin-
alized, and the market has developed other governance mechanisms to 
compensate for the owners’ apathy. 
B. The Advantages of Public Investment 
Despite the agency costs inherent in the Berle−Means corporation, 
society frequently turns to that business form because of the advantages 
widely dispersed public investment can provide, both to companies that 
go public and to investors who want to buy their stock. Offering shares 
of stock to the public provides access to a tremendous amount of rela-
tively cheap capital.32 Equity investors do not charge interest rates, nor 
do they engage in close monitoring of management. Public capital allows 
a large number of investors to give small amounts of money, thereby 
spreading the risk of each specific investment among a large group of 
investors who can diversify away idiosyncratic risk.33 
This is not to say that going public is inexpensive. Securities laws 
impose many disclosure requirements, and compliance with those laws is 
                                                 
 29. Shareholders may have the incentives to exercise more reasoned judgment when consider-
ing a takeover attempt because they will have an opportunity to receive a premium for their shares. 
MACEY, supra note 11, at 119. 
 30. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality, 
59 EMORY L.J. 869, 870 (2010). 
 31. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus 
of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1136–37 (2011). 
 32. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A. C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 
409–11 (1st ed. 2005). 
 33. Id. at 21–23. 
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expensive.34 Firms issuing public stock must undergo careful inspection 
by underwriters in the name of “due diligence.”35 Market investors de-
pend on this due diligence in deciding whether to buy the security of-
fered and are willing to take the risk associated with equity securities 
because of, in part, the protection these disclosure and due diligence re-
quirements are supposed to provide.36 Firms must pay large fees to the 
professionals responsible for helping them comply with securities laws.37 
Disclosure requirements may help investors, but they are not free. Still, 
faith in the disclosure regime, and available liability for fraudulent repre-
sentations in disclosures, provide comfort to large groups of investors 
and encourage them to invest in firms they cannot monitor closely.38 
Shareholders are able to bear the risks of not monitoring manage-
ment partially because they are able to hold a diversified portfolio of in-
vestments so that the risk they take with any one firm is neutralized. Pub-
lic shareholding allows businesses and investors to spread risk so that no 
one investor will lose too much if a particular firm or project fails, and so 
profitable risk-taking is safer.39 A robust secondary market in corporate 
stock allows shareholders to exit firms that are underperforming or poor-
ly managed, thereby lowering the risk a shareholder takes by investing in 
any one firm. Market liquidity enables shareholders to maintain well-
diversified portfolios, which in turn, allow them to invest in some riskier 
propositions. Entrepreneurs may seek public investors to shift the risk of 
business projects to investors who can “diversify away” this firm-
specific risk.40 Entrepreneurs thus benefit from “going public.” 
In addition to spreading and neutralizing risk, public investment in 
equity also allows us to spread wealth throughout society. Widely dis-
persed investors are able to participate in the wealth generated by large, 
public corporations so that more than a very few can participate in those 
gains. Allowing many investors to contribute small amounts to various 
companies through well-diversified portfolios allows them to enjoy the 
growth of the market as a whole. Public investment is good for both in-
                                                 
 34. See MACEY, supra note 11, at 128–29. 
 35. Id. at 127. 
 36. Id. at 127–28. 
 37. Id. at 127–29. 
 38. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 32, at 31–32. 
 39. This basic understanding of the advantages of the public capital markets overlooks, for 
now, the risk associated with “linkages” among significant investors that may result in systemic 
risk—the risk that a market shock can cause a domino effect that will hurt the market as a whole. 
Systemic risk that affects a market cannot be diversified away. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 
97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200–01 (2008). 
 40. James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1187, 
1189–90 (2007). 
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vestors and the offering companies, then, because they are able to spread 
risk and share wealth in a system largely protected by federal regulation. 
C. Disadvantages of the Rationally Apathetic “Owner” 
As valuable as a robust system of public investment is to companies 
and investors alike, the rationally apathetic shareholder exacts costs be-
cause publicly owned corporations lack meaningful, attentive “owner-
ship.” Many of the weaknesses of the public corporations’ governance 
structure can be blamed on the inability of shareholders to perform the 
role reserved for them in corporate governance.41 Individual public 
shareholders do not have incentives to work toward lower agency costs 
in their relationship with management.42 
The collective action problem of widely dispersed shareholders in 
the Berle−Means corporation prevents shareholders from monitoring 
management and influencing important decisions. A shareholder who 
participates in governance would have to share the gains of any interven-
tion with scores of other investors who could free ride on its efforts.43 
This collective-action problem afflicts even the institutional investors 
who represent large numbers of beneficial owners of public stock.44 Mu-
tual fund managers, for example, do not have incentives to do more work 
than other fund managers because those other fund managers—their 
competitors—will benefit from any effort, and the market in mutual 
funds keeps all management fees at about the same level. A mutual fund 
manager would not realize more of a benefit from investing in monitor-
ing management than the effort would cost.45 
Shareholders also generally lack the expertise necessary to serious-
ly challenge management. One benefit of the corporate model is that 
shareholders can delegate management authority to professional manag-
                                                 
 41. Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 3, at 1745; Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. L. REV. 547, 568 (2003) 
[hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]. 
 42. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 71, 71 (“[W]ealth-maximizing individuals . . . will rarely find it in their interest to contribute to 
goods that benefit the group as a whole, but rather will ‘free ride’ on the contributions that other 
group members make. As a result, too few individuals will contribute sufficiently, and the well-
being of the group will suffer.” (citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 1 
(1965))). 
 43. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 41, at 558–59 (stating that shareholders will not 
expend the necessary effort to “make informed decisions . . . if the expected benefits of doing so 
outweigh [the] costs”). 
 44. See Rock, supra note 17, at 472–78. 
 45. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 562–63 
(1990). 
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ers who are presumably better qualified to make business judgments.46 
This delegation of authority allows shareholders to diversify their in-
vestments and mitigate their risk through diversification instead of moni-
toring, and therefore, to spend their time more productively. Even institu-
tional investors are not qualified to second-guess management. While 
institutional investors may be sophisticated in making investment choices 
and they may understand better than others when and how to move mon-
ey, they lack sufficient information about individual portfolio companies 
to challenge management in any serious way and do not have the same 
skill for business management as officers.47 
Because of the collective-action problem and their rational apathy, 
the shareholders of public corporations rarely engage in close monitoring 
of corporate officers and directors and do not spend time exercising care-
ful, independent judgment in shareholder elections.48 Indeed, much of the 
work shareholders could do to reduce agency costs has also been dele-
gated to other professionals. An active bar of plaintiffs’ attorneys identi-
fy most opportunities for shareholder litigation to enforce directors’ du-
ties,49 and institutional investors delegate the task of making decisions 
about matters that come up for shareholder votes to proxy advisors.50 
Still, deference to management is the norm in court as well as in share-
holder elections, and the shareholders’ ability to intervene in decision-
making or discipline managers is weak and often ignored.51 
Because shareholders do not actively exercise the role reserved for 
them in corporate governance, there is a significant gap in corporate dis-
cipline.52 The market has turned to other mechanisms for monitoring and 
disciplining management. Some of those mechanisms resemble the de-
vices used by uncorporate firms to keep agency costs low. This overlap 
                                                 
 46. See Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 3, at 1749 (“The chief economic 
virtue of the public corporation is . . . that it provides a hierarchical decisionmaking structure well-
suited to the problem of operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees, managers, 
shareholders, creditors, and other constituencies.”). 
 47. Rock, supra note 17, at 472–78. 
 48. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 1266–67 
(2009). 
 49. Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the General Law Compli-
ance Obligation in Section 2.01(a) of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance, 66 WASH. L. REV. 413, 424 (1991) (describing the plaintiffs’ corporate bar as “the engine that 
drives shareholder litigation”). 
 50. Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 30, at 882. 
 51. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
833, 836–38 (2005). 
 52. See Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 717 (arguing that a collec-
tive-action problem keeps shareholders from performing their monitoring function in the firm effec-
tively). 
2012] Strengthening Investment in Public Corporations 1019 
shows how some uncorporate governance mechanisms can fit with pub-
lic corporate governance, even though the fit might not be quite perfect. 
D. Market-Based Governance Mechanisms 
Given the limitations of a system that, at least theoretically, relies 
on rationally apathetic shareholders to act as owners, the market has 
filled the governance gaps with other mechanisms. Chief among these 
mechanisms are the use of debt to discipline management and the use of 
incentive compensation to directly align the interests of managers with 
shareholders. These mechanisms are similar to key features in 
uncorporate governance. 
Corporate creditors discipline management by requiring regular dis-
tributions of cash in the form of interest payments.53 The fixed term of 
loans also requires managers to return to the capital markets for addition-
al credit, so they have to make the case that their company and their 
plans are worthy of additional investment. Through rights reserved in 
covenants, creditors of public firms are able to influence corporate busi-
ness decisions and directly monitor officers and directors.54 Creditors 
have an advantage over shareholders in this regard because they are not 
as widely dispersed and they are directly represented before management 
by closely supervised, focused professionals. Creditors in Berle−Means 
corporations are able to constrain corporate agency costs in such a way 
that shareholders often benefit from creditors’ involvement in govern-
ance and are able to free ride on the monitoring that creditors do.55 
Of course, the interests of shareholders and creditors are not always 
perfectly aligned, and shareholders may prefer to invest in a firm not 
weighted down with debt, as too much debt can threaten financial ruin. 
High leverage is risky because it makes it more difficult for a firm to 
weather business slumps or economic downturns. Shareholders also pre-
fer a higher degree of risk taking than creditors do because shareholders 
enjoy an unlimited upside gain while their downside risk is limited to the 
investment they made in the firm.56 Creditors do not benefit from the 
                                                 
 53. The disciplining effect of debt was explained as a significant component of corporate gov-
ernance and lowering agency costs in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 314–16 
(1976). Larry Ribstein explained that equity holders in uncorporate firms are able to discipline man-
agers by requiring regular distributions from the firm. RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, at 163. 
 54. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corpo-
rate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1244–45 (2006). 
 55. Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 4 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonell eds., 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1760488. 
 56. This point is made by Chancellor Allen in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe 
Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
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high-return potential of high-risk corporate investments. Accordingly, 
creditors try to use their influence over management to encourage more 
conservative strategies.57 
Shareholders are able to balance creditor risk preferences and the 
natural risk aversion of managers58 by using incentive compensation, 
particularly equity compensation, to try to more closely align managerial 
interests with those of shareholders.59 Corporate managers are usually 
paid in options in the firm’s stock, which allows them to enjoy increases 
in the firm’s stock price without taking on downside risk.60 The purpose 
of compensation with options is to bring the managers’ personal risk 
preferences closer to those of well-diversified Berle−Means sharehold-
ers.61 
Of course, equity compensation is not perfect, and the risk-seeking 
behaviors it has encouraged have been blamed for the recent financial 
crisis.62 Managers can take too much risk, and when enough firm manag-
ers do, the consequences can be far-reaching. Both debt financing and 
incentive compensation add some risk while reducing some agency costs. 
Governance mechanisms exist together in a balance that is sup-
posed to reduce agency costs more than it enhances them. We might find 
that some governance tools work in both Berle−Means corporations and 
small uncorporations. But the distinct forms each offer both advantages 
and disadvantages. Having explored the advantages and disadvantages of 
the public Berle−Means corporation, this Article now turns to the 
uncorporation. 
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF UNCORPORATIONS 
Small businesses moved to uncorporations as hybrid business forms 
that were invented to combine the governance and tax advantages of 
                                                 
 57. Id. 
 58. Managers have only one job at a time and rely on the firm for their professional reputation 
and income, so they are naturally less well-diversified and are more risk averse than the 
Berle−Means shareholders. See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation 
Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 889 (2007). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive Pay: Contrac-
tual Unconscionability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1196 (2011). 
 61. See Ryan Houseal, Beyond the Business Judgment Rule: Protecting Bidder Firm Share-
holders from Value-Reducing Acquisitions, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 193, 221 (2003). 
 62. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and 
Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 360 (2009); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker 
Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 
1206 (2011); David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 
51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 435–36 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1647025http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1647025. 
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partnerships with the limited liability offered to shareholders of corpora-
tions.63 Even though they are predominantly privately held, 
uncorporations have found a role in the public securities markets, and 
many sophisticated, important firms take uncorporate forms.64 While 
many uncorporations are small businesses, the uncorporations this Arti-
cle focuses on are those that interact with the public investment markets 
as private equity funds, mutual funds, or hedge funds. 
A. Advantages 
Uncorporate forms tend to have lower agency costs than public 
corporations, in no small part because they have fewer equity holders. 
This means that each owner has a larger share of the firm’s equity inter-
est and therefore has greater incentive to actively monitor management. 
The owners of an uncorporation can engage in more active monitoring 
and make demands of management that Berle−Means shareholders either 
cannot or will not because of their collective-action problems and the 
limitations of the corporate form. 
For example, owners of an uncorporate business can demand regu-
lar distributions of capital from the firm.65 Uncorporations do not place 
the premium on capital lock-in that corporations do.66 Uncorporate own-
ers may also be able to exit the firm by having their equity shares re-
deemed.67 It is more important that individual owners be able to exit the 
firm when they wish to because there is not a ready market for 
uncorporate shares.68 This ability to demand capital from the 
uncorporation disciplines management because it requires managers to 
make sure there is enough capital in the firm to honor the demands of 
owners. 
A related advantage of uncorporations is that they are usually oper-
ated for defined terms.69 When the expiration of the term nears, managers 
must return to the capital markets to seek new investments in order to 
continue the business.70 Because managers cannot count on keeping capi-
tal in the firm in order to direct its use according to their discretion, they 
                                                 
 63. RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, at 137–38. 
 64. Id. at 222. 
 65. See id. at 163. 
 66. Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation’s Domain, 55 VILL. L. REV. 125, 128 (2010). 
 67. John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee 
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 88 (2010). 
 68. Uncorporate owners are typically only able to transfer their economic rights in the firm, not 
their management rights, without the approval of their fellow owners. This restriction limits the 
universe of investors uncorporate owners can sell their shares to and thereby limits their ability to 
exit the firm at will. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, at 182. 
 69. Id. at 223. 
 70. Id. 
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must explain their plans for the capital to sophisticated investors. The 
limited term also provides uncorporate owners another opportunity to 
exit. They are guaranteed the opportunity to cash in their shares at the 
expiration of the term. Not only are uncorporate owners able to monitor 
management better, but they are also able to define the terms of their exit 
ex ante. 
Uncorporations also use compensation schemes that tie managers’ 
pay directly to the firm’s financial success. In some uncorporations, par-
ticularly very closely held ones, owners serve as managers, and so their 
interests in managing the firm are directly tied to the firm’s profitabil-
ity.71 Investment funds that are run as uncorporations usually pay manag-
ers a small fee for the size of the assets they manage, as well as a larger 
fee as a percentage of profits realized.72 Because uncorporate owners 
hold larger stakes in uncorporate firms than most shareholders do in pub-
lic corporations, it is easier to align managerial interests with the equity 
position. This can be done by making managers owners or by giving 
them a relatively undiversified interest in the firm. Uncorporate owners 
are undiversified relative to public shareholders, so more managerial risk 
aversion is likely to suit their interests. 
Because fewer owners are involved, and they each have more at 
stake, agency costs in uncorporate firms tend to be lower than those in 
Berle−Means corporations. Uncorporate owners have greater incentives 
to monitor managers more carefully. The owners may manage the firm 
themselves, and if they are unhappy with how the firm is doing, they can 
usually exit by withdrawing the capital they contributed. Agency costs, 
however, still exist for uncorporations, and the use of uncorporations 
may be stunted by some shortcomings. 
B. Disadvantages 
There is rarely a robust secondary market in uncorporate shares be-
cause uncorporations tend to be privately and closely held.73 That ab-
sence prevents the development of a control market that could discipline 
management. A market for control may be less important in closely-held 
                                                 
 71. Id. at 147, 150. 
 72. Id. at 223. 
 73. William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegrega-
tion in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 75 (2009). Birdthistle and Henderson identify potential 
conflicts of interests for managers of private equity funds and argue that a “robust secondary mar-
ket” in the limited-partnership shares could mitigate the effects of those conflicts. Id. at 54. They 
point out that the general partners managing the funds disfavor sales of limited-partnership shares to 
strangers of the partnership, but argue that a robust secondary market will create a market for control 
that will discipline managers and lower the costs their conflicted interests impose on owners. Id. at 
74–75. 
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firms with the mechanisms for discipline described above. Still, some 
uncorporations, such as mutual funds or private equity funds, may bene-
fit from a market for control, especially to the extent owners think the 
pay structures are poorly designed or managers have conflicted inter-
ests.74 Another issue is that uncorporate owners may not be able to exit 
the firm before expiration of the firm’s stated term,75 while a secondary 
market in their shares would give them an easy exit option. 
The lack of a secondary market for uncorporate shares also makes it 
difficult for owners of uncorporations to diversify their uncorporate hold-
ings. Uncorporate investments tend to be much larger than investments 
in public corporations.76 That means uncorporate owners have much 
more to lose with each investment and are necessarily less diversified 
with regard to those investments. Of course, an uncorporate investor can 
have a diverse portfolio that includes many kinds of investments, but 
some scholars think there would be advantages to allowing greater diver-
sification of uncorproate holdings.77 Removing this “disadvantage” may 
do more harm than good, however, if we think attentive owners are an 
important part of the relatively low agency costs investors can enjoy in 
uncorporate investments. Uncorporate owners’ undiversified position 
gives them incentives to be attentive to management. Removing that in-
centive could also eliminate a chief advantage of closely held 
uncorporations. 
The relative lack of diversification for uncorporate investors is a di-
rect consequence of the fact that the vast majority of uncorporations are 
not publicly traded.78 Uncorporations are thus spared the expense of 
complying with securities regulations.79 But that also means that their 
investors cannot benefit from the protections offered by the securities 
laws. Unwary investors may be at risk of fraud at the hands of managers 
of private firms, particularly if the investors have made large invest-
ments. The large investments required to invest in private equity firms or 
hedge funds usually ensure that only sophisticated investors take on 
those risks. Still, not all private equity managers are successful or good at 
                                                 
 74. Id. at 54. 
 75. Id. at 77–78. 
 76. Hedge funds and private equity funds, for example, cater to sophisticated investors and 
have high minimum-investment thresholds. 
 77. Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 73, at 78–80. 
 78. Only a few uncorporations can be publicly traded, and those firms must be somewhat pas-
sively managed holding companies of specific kinds of investments. RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, at 231–
32. 
 79. But some private uncorporations are “public” for the purpose of complying with the provi-
sions of Sarbanes-Oxley because they used high-yield debt financing or public debt to finance their 
“going private” transactions. Robert P. Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining 
the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 9 (2009). 
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what they do, and risks of loss abound. These private-investment firms 
are regulated far less than public operating firms.80 That allows private 
firms to realize gains from more aggressive business strategies and to 
avoid the high costs of complying with complicated securities laws. It 
also exposes their investors to risks Berle−Means shareholders are not 
forced to assume. 
IV. HOW TO BRING THEM TOGETHER 
When two somewhat similar structures have advantages and disad-
vantages, it is sometimes tempting to combine them. While corporate and 
uncorporate governance structures have key differences, they are similar 
in nature and have very similar origins. Still, the differences in their 
structure afford each form of investment and business organization dis-
tinct advantages. Those advantages would be compromised by trying to 
make uncorporations more like corporations and vice versa. Instead, we 
should maximize the benefits investors can realize from the interaction of 
private uncorporations and public corporations by opening investment in 
uncorporations more broadly and finding ways for the universe of public 
investors to enjoy the benefits afforded by careful, attentive ownership. 
A. Suggestions to Share Governance Mechanisms 
It might seem that uncorporations and corporations should share 
some features, adapting the more successful governance mechanisms 
each possess to solve the problems of the other. In some ways, that is 
how the most popular uncorporations were born; they combined the most 
desirable attributes of corporations⎯limited liability and professional 
managers⎯with the most desirable attributes of partnerships⎯owner 
management and flow-through taxation.81 Some might want to offer 
uncorporate owners better opportunities for diversification,82 for exam-
ple, or be tempted to make Berle−Means shareholders more attentive or 
to give them greater power over management.83 
If we carry a desire to combine business forms too far, though, we 
might undermine the advantages each form has to offer. For instance, the 
diversification provided to Berle−Means shareholders in the strong sec-
ondary market for their shares renders shares of stock fungible. Thus, a 
shareholder can easily move out of a poorly performing company and 
                                                 
 80. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 639 (2009). 
 81. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, at 120. 
 82. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 73, at 78–80. 
 83. See Bebchuk, supra note 51, at 850–75. 
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into an investment in another similar company that is better managed.84 
That significant advantage, however, also has costs. It renders 
Berle−Means shareholders rationally apathetic, ineffective owners who 
cannot monitor management and would not want to if they could.85 
While uncorporate shareholders might benefit from diversification and a 
robust secondary market for uncorporate equity, agency costs are en-
hanced by the apathy that shelters shareholders from managerial deci-
sion-making. If uncorporate shareholders want to become indifferent 
monitors of management, they will need to find ways to reduce agency 
costs and might turn to corporate mechanisms like fiduciary duties. Then 
the uncorporation would be plagued by the exact problems facing the 
Berle−Means corporation, and it would have lost some of its advantages. 
Likewise, those trying to fix the Berle−Means corporation might be 
tempted to overcome the problems caused by rational shareholder apathy 
by concentrating shareholding, giving shareholders more power to vote 
on corporate decision-making, or trying to align managerial interests 
with the value of the residual claim by paying executives with stock op-
tions. Each of these “uncorporate” features has been adapted to the cor-
porate form to varying degrees. For example, institutional shareholders 
have concentrated the shareholder position to a large degree by repre-
senting large numbers of beneficial owners⎯individual shareholders⎯in 
investment decisions.86 The presence of institutional shareholders has 
enhanced the shareholder voice to some extent, by concentrating voting 
power and giving shareholders more sophisticated direct representation 
as they exercise their rights in governance.87 Still, those institutional 
shareholders often do not actively represent shareholder interests, either 
because of collective-action problems facing them88 or conflicted inter-
ests.89 Like the widely dispersed individual shareholders they represent, 
institutional shareholders find it more cost-effective to exit an underper-
                                                 
 84. See Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 263 (2007). 
 85. Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 3, at 1745. 
 86. See, e.g., Robert G. Vanecko, Regulations 14a and 13d and the Role of Institutional Inves-
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 88. See Black, supra note 45, at 566–67. 
 89. See Jennifer S. Taub, Able But Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advo-
cate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 878 (2009). 
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forming firm than to exercise their voice to improve it.90 The ability to be 
a rationally apathetic equity holder, protected by diversification, is an 
advantage of the Berle−Means corporation that shareholders are not will-
ing to give up. 
We can still use the advantages of uncorporations to help corpora-
tions and vice versa, but they may be more helpful to each other if the 
business forms remain distinct and then interact to provide investors a 
variety of options. 
B. How Corporations and Uncorporations Interact 
Uncorporations have become active players in Berle−Means corpo-
rations. The presence of a robust public capital market allows 
uncorporations to profit from their work in corporations. Corporations 
may realize temporary benefits from skilled, focused management and 
ownership by uncorporations, and uncorporations are able to profit from 
the public capital markets while still realizing the advantages of the 
uncorporate form. 
Uncorporate firms cannot be publicly traded operating companies.91 
Securities regulations and tax rules prevent most uncorporations from 
being publicly held.92 They can, however, own shares in publicly traded 
operating companies, and can access the tremendous capital in the public 
markets by incorporating and taking their firms public.93 Uncorporate 
firms can also sell public debt.94 The wall between uncorporations and 
the public markets also prevents most investors from sharing in the 
wealth generated by uncorporate investment firms. Uncorporations do 
play an important role in the public markets, even if they are privately 
held, and their influence on the governance of public corporations and on 
the public-securities markets is significant. 
Private equity funds, hedge funds, and mutual funds are 
uncorporate firms that trade in, and sometimes purchase substantial 
stakes in, the stock of publicly traded operating companies. Hedge funds 
and other private equity funds sometimes buy entire public companies, 
                                                 
 90. The “Wall Street Rule” refers to the proposition that a stockholder will simply sell his or 
her stock rather than try to change the company’s management or policies. See Black, supra note 45, 
at 534. 
 91. The uncorporations that can be publicly traded are limited to those that realize gains from 
specific investments, such as publicly traded partnerships whose profits consist of returns on invest-
ments. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, at 231–32. 
 92. “The Internal Revenue Code permits partnership-type ‘flow-through’ taxation in publicly 
traded firms that mostly earn ‘qualifying income,’ defined to include (among other things) interest, 
dividends, rents, and capital gains.” Id. 
 93. See Ribstein, supra note 66, at 137–41. 
 94. Bartlett, supra note 79, at 9. 
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thereby turning them private, in order to reorganize them and realize sig-
nificant gains when the “new and improved” firm is again offered to the 
public markets, either through an IPO or an acquisition by another public 
firm.95 This cycle of going private and returning public can be an im-
portant part of the life of some corporations. It serves as an alternative to 
reorganization in bankruptcy and disciplines corporate managers.96 Poor-
ly performing managers are removed by the new owner, the private equi-
ty firm, and the corporation’s capital structure and business practices 
may be altered significantly. 
Even if an uncorporation does not acquire the entire corporation, it 
may purchase a significant amount of the corporation’s stock or may in-
vest heavily in the corporation’s publicly traded debt, particularly when 
the firm is in financial trouble. In this way, hedge funds can play an im-
portant role as “activist” investors, using the rights they have on account 
of their stock ownership or debt ownership in a bankruptcy to strongly 
influence business decisions and steer the corporation on a profitable 
course.97 Other investors sometimes resent the role these “vulture” inves-
tors play in a public corporation, arguing that their interests are at odds 
with other corporate constituents or the long-term profitability of the 
firm.98 There is a sense, among some, that private equity firms and hedge 
funds appropriate wealth from the public investment markets and public 
companies opportunistically and in a way that destroys social value.99 So 
while uncorporate investment in public corporations may be profitable to 
the uncorporation, it may also compromise the interests of the 
Berle−Means investors. 
The investors who typically own stock in Berle−Means corpora-
tions have found ways to participate in the gains of private equity 
firms.100 A significant portion of capital invested in private equity firms 
comes from institutional shareholders, public pension funds, private pen-
sion funds, and mutual funds representing and investing on behalf of the 
numerous, widely dispersed shareholders who also invest in public cor-
porations.101 In this way, Berle−Means shareholders may be able to real-
ize the advantages offered by uncorporate investment by including own-
ership in uncorporate firms in their diversified portfolios. This access to 
uncorporations also gives the rationally apathetic shareholders, who in-
                                                 
 95. See MACEY, supra note 11, at 241. 
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vest through institutional shareholders and pension funds, the ability, 
through the managers of these private equity firms, to realize the benefits 
of more attentive ownership of some major corporations. This expansion 
of “public” investment into “private” uncorporations holds significant 
promise to allow investors to realize the best of both worlds. 
That might lead us to wonder: if institutional shareholders can ef-
fectively perform the owners’ role in uncorporations, why can’t they do a 
better job of monitoring managers of Berle−Means corporations? For the 
most part, the uncorporations that institutional shareholders invest in are 
not operating companies, but rather investment funds. Institutional 
shareholders may be better-suited to monitoring a manager who is mak-
ing investments and essentially performing the “shareholder role” in a 
public corporation than they are at monitoring managers who are making 
business decisions for an operating company. 
Private equity firms that take public companies private do so in or-
der to reorganize the firm and achieve the stated goal of a turnaround, not 
as a long-term business plan for operating success.102 Managers of pri-
vate equity firms know how to turn an operating company around but do 
not necessarily have the same ability to operate a business in the long 
term. But they are unlike turnaround or bankruptcy specialists in an im-
portant way—instead of being paid as professionals, they take an owner-
ship stake in the companies they reorganize. 
The form of the public corporation is still best-suited to the man-
agement of a large operating company with widely dispersed ownership. 
That structure allows investors to delegate authority to those most quali-
fied to operate a particular business in a particular industry. Those man-
agers may prefer to work as employees rather than owners. Investors can 
protect themselves from the poor management of any one firm through 
diversification. Here, we see different business structures work best for 
different business goals. The interaction of business forms can enhance 
the governance structures and profitability of each. 
C. Extending the Reach of the Uncorporation by Broadening Investment 
While sometimes problematic, ownership of the stock of publicly 
traded companies by private equity funds or hedge funds can be profita-
ble. It can also be an effective way to find an attentive party to perform 
the shareholder role in the firm’s governance. Private equity funds can 
                                                 
 102. See, e.g., Antonio Vives, Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Law and Markets 
and the Case of Developing Countries, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199, 225 (2008) (“With the insatiable 
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perform the shareholder function best when they own a significant posi-
tion in the same class of stock that is owned by the public shareholders 
and if they buy their interest in the public company on the market rather 
than from the company.103 If private equity firms simply act as interested 
shareholders who want to enhance the value of the firm, private funds 
can enhance the value of all shares to the extent they improve the firm’s 
governance. 
Of course, private funds face the same collective-action problems 
confronting other investors in doing the shareholder job for a public 
company unless they hold a significant share of the company’s stock. 
Private equity funds and hedge funds may try to extract value from the 
firm to the exclusion of other shareholders and may have interests at 
odds with other shareholders.104 Some might say that opportunism is per-
vasive in this situation; that is because it is the only way for these funds 
to realize private benefits from the work they do to change the firm’s 
governance. Opportunism is how they overcome the collective-action 
problem. 
Berle−Means shareholders can participate in these gains from the 
private governance of public companies if they can invest in the private 
funds themselves. Many Berle−Means shareholders are invested in these 
funds because, as mentioned above, institutional shareholders invest in 
private equity funds on behalf of the widely dispersed beneficial owners 
they represent. Making that kind of investment available to more inves-
tors allows those gains to be shared more generally among investors 
holding well-diversified portfolios and also allows private equity funds 
to spread the risk they take when they make these substantial invest-
ments. Broadening the universe of investors who can invest in private 
equity and hedge funds would give those funds some of the advantages 
the public capital markets could offer. We might be able to realize “pub-
lic ownership of private equity.”105 
Public holding companies provide an example of how public in-
vestment in a fund that acts as a professional shareholder might work. 
While many public holding companies are financial institutions, famed 
                                                 
 103. Some companies offer public stock directly to private equity funds in transactions called 
PIPEs, or private investment in public equity. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., PIPEs, 2 
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investor Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway is an example of how 
public shareholders can benefit from skilled, active shareholding by 
managers. Berkshire Hathaway is a public company that invests signifi-
cantly in specific public operating companies that are chosen carefully by 
its management according to which companies seem, in management’s 
estimation, to have the most potential for long-term growth and profita-
bility.106 Because Berkshire Hathaway shares are so expensive, the sec-
ondary market in its shares is practically limited. But Berkshire Hatha-
way’s success shows us how public shareholders can benefit from invest-
ing in a company that specializes in being an attentive shareholder, as 
long as the company does well (as any company must do in order to be 
profitable). 
The investment of institutional shareholders representing “public” 
shareholders in private equity funds and the success of a public holding 
company like Berkshire Hathaway show that the market is moving to-
ward hybrid investment schemes. Rather than bridging the governance 
gap between corporations and uncorporations to make the forms more 
like each other, or moving to a system of solely public corporations or 
solely private uncorporations, Berle−Means shareholders have found 
ways to invest in firms that perform the shareholder role effectively and 
private funds have found ways to benefit from the tremendous capital 
available in the public markets. Investors want to be able to participate in 
the advantages that both of the distinct forms provide. Removing obsta-
cles from this progression in the market may lead to better investing, 
which in turn, may lead to better governance of public corporations and 
private uncorporations. 
This shift in investment practices must be executed carefully, how-
ever. It is still important to make the securities markets safe for less so-
phisticated investors. Thus far, less sophisticated investors with relatively 
small amounts to invest have been kept out of investing in hedge funds 
and private equity funds, except to the extent they are represented by 
large institutional shareholders. The securities laws that protect such in-
vestors from the potential dangers of investment in Berle−Means corpo-
rations prevent most uncorporations from being publicly traded, and may 
impose regulations and disclosure obligations that discourage private 
equity funds and hedge funds from seeking a broader base of investors. 
It would be useful to determine what baseline protections we should 
provide for all investors in the public markets and where we want to 
draw that line, and then promulgate regulations that provide those protec-
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tions to all firms, uncorporations and corporations, that pose a certain 
level of risk for relatively unsophisticated investors. This Article does 
not try to determine where those lines should be drawn, nor what those 
protections should be. We can probably already identify certain desirable 
protections that would apply to a broad base of firms, with more particu-
lar provisions for different kinds of business forms as their structures 
require. The adjustments should not be difficult. Indeed, private equity 
firms issuing public debt to finance their transactions run into the re-
quirements of the federal securities laws even though their equity shares 
are not publicly traded.107 As it is, the securities laws apply to small and 
large firms in sometimes unanticipated ways. By determining what base-
line protections are most important, regulators can protect investors in 
ways they deem essential without interfering unnecessarily with business 
governance itself. 
Some might wonder why private equity funds would submit to fed-
eral securities regulation if they do not have to—why they would want to 
“go public” in any sense at all. In fact, a few large private equity firms 
are already publicly traded.108 Of course, some may not want to expand 
the base of their investors. If they do not want to, they certainly do not 
have to. They might find advantages in ready access to the capital avail-
able in the public capital markets though. Their interaction with those 
markets through institutional investors and issuance of public debt seems 
to indicate that they find advantages that make tolerating some additional 
regulation worthwhile. The amount of regulation necessary to allow 
those funds to open investment in their equity shares more broadly may 
not be significant enough to dramatically increase costs. Operating firms 
can also make a choice, but enough firms choose to enter the public capi-
tal market that the benefits must outweigh the costs for some. The same 
is likely to be true of uncorporations. 
The benefit for uncorporations still lies in having a relatively small 
number of equity holders and operating in defined terms for relatively 
specific purposes. Those protections should remain in place. I am not 
suggesting that we turn the uncorporation into the Berle−Means corpora-
tion, only that we make investment in uncorporations more available to a 
broader cross-section of investors. 
One consequence of this expansion of investment is that the number 
of uncorporations filling this space may increase significantly, as they try 
to buy shares in public companies or attempt leveraged takeovers of 
troubled firms. Of course, not all funds are going to be up to that task, 
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and investors may suffer for their failures. Leveraged buyouts may have 
to be watched more carefully for fraudulent-conveyance liability, and it 
may make sense to lengthen the reach-back period for fraudulent con-
veyances in leveraged buyouts.109 With more firms participating, a robust 
market will begin to favor the more skilled firms. Too much concentra-
tion in private equity activity may lead to conflicted interests and under-
mine the protections we have in place that prevent too much concentra-
tion of investment in too few entities.110 
Here, I suggest only that private equity funds and hedge funds 
might provide a new kind of product, better-suited to a wider base of in-
vestors. In some ways, they are already doing that through institutional 
investment in their funds. They might be able to expand that practice 
more easily if uncorporations are allowed to appeal to public investors 
more broadly. Then, public investors could benefit from the work of pri-
vate equity funds, and those benefits might neutralize some of the losses 
that public shareholders can realize at the hands of opportunistic private 
equity funds elsewhere in their portfolios. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Corporations and uncorporate business forms have distinct ad-
vantages. The corporate form is best-suited to the governance of large, 
publicly held operating firms. The uncorporation dominates the field of 
closely held businesses and investment firms. The uncorporation and 
public corporation have a lot to offer each other by interacting with one 
another. Giving public investors the opportunity to invest in both kinds 
of firms may allow the firms to be more profitable and may give inves-
tors more access to the profits produced in the capital markets. It is by 
opening investment, rather than by conflating governance structures, that 
corporations and uncorporations can benefit each other and investors can 
enjoy the best of what each business form has to offer. 
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